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In this Reply we propose a modified security proof of the Quantum Dense Key Distribution
protocol detecting also the eavesdropping attack proposed by Wo´jcik in his Comment.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Hk, 03.65.Ud
In his Comment [1], Wo´jcik proposes two simple
schemes for performing eavesdropping attacks to the
Quantum Dense Key Distribution protocol (QDKD) in
Ref. [2]. These schemes enable Eve to achieve a larger
mutual information than Alice’s and Bob’s one, but
maintaining inviolated the security condition (Eq. (6)
in Ref. [2]).
Eve’s attack in Wo´jcik’s schemes relies on the possibil-
ity of subtraction of photons from the quantum channel
without being disclosed by the Anticorrelation Check. In
fact the security proof given in [2] is incomplete because
it includes only the effect that Eve’s presence induces a
bit flip on the travelling qubit.
In this reply we complete the security proof of QDKD
even against individual eavesdropping attack with injec-
tion or subtraction of photons in the quantum channels.
Furthermore we discuss the security of the experimen-
tal realization of the QDKD protocol performed in [2],
according to the arguments raised by the modified proof.
A dedicated formalism is introduced to account for
these attacks. Let |mnX〉 be the state with n photons on
the quantum channel X, where m photons have horizon-
tal polarization and (n −m) vertical polarization. The
orthonormal base BX : {|m
n
X〉} spans the Hilbert space
HX of photons in channel X; |0
0
X〉 is the vacuum state.
In the actual formalism, referring to Fig. 1 in Ref.
[2], Alice produces pairs of photons in the singlet state
|ψ−AB〉 =
1√
2
(|01A1
1
B〉− |1
1
A0
1
B〉). Photon A is stored in her
laboratory while on photon B she performs either the op-
eration 1B (identity operator) or ẐB before sending it to
Bob. A generalized gate ẐB acts in the Hilbert space HB
as ẐB|m
n
B〉 = (−1)
m|mnB〉. ẐB is hermitian and unitary,
and corresponds to the Pauli matrix σ̂Z acting individu-
ally on each photon in the channel B. Alice’s selection of
gate 1B or ẐB is encoded according to
1B|ψ
−
AB〉 = |ψ
−
AB〉 −→ bit 0
ẐB|ψ
−
AB〉 = −|ψ
+
AB〉 −→ bit 1, (1)
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with |ψ+AB〉 =
1√
2
(|01A1
1
B〉+ |1
1
A0
1
B〉).
Bob randomly switches photon B towards either the
Anticorrelation Check or his encoding apparatus.
The Anticorrelation Check is performed by Bob pro-
jecting photon B on the states |01B〉 and |1
1
B〉 and Alice
projecting photon A on the states |11A〉, and |0
1
A〉, re-
spectively. The non-local measurement guarantees the
security of the transmission.
Bob’s encoding apparatus is identical to Alice’s. The
communication takes place sending back photon B to Al-
ice, who performs the incomplete Bell’s state analysis.
Specifically, |ψ+AB〉 corresponds to Alice and Bob encod-
ing 0 and 1 or 1 and 0 respectively, while |ψ−AB〉 corre-
sponds to Alice and Bob both encoding 0 or 1. In other
words the measurement of |ψ+AB〉, |ψ
−
AB〉 corresponds to
the sum mod 2 of the bits encoded by Alice and Bob.
We model the general individual Eve’s attack by cou-
pling photon B with an ancilla system of Hilbert space
HE in the initial state |eE〉 by means of general unitary
operators ĴBE and K̂BE before and after Bob’s opera-
tions, respectively. The final state belongs to the widened
Hilbert space HA ⊗ HB ⊗HE. This approach is general
because any physical non-unitary interaction is equiva-
lent to a unitary one with a higher dimensional ancilla
space [3].
The final state after Bob’s and Eve’s operations is de-
scribed by the trace preserving quantum operation E
E(ρ̂AB) =
1
2
E1B(ρ̂AB) +
1
2
E
ẐB
(ρ̂AB), (2)
where E
ẐB
and E1B are quantum operations describing
the evolution of the initial state ρ̂AB prepared by Alice
and modified by Bob’s and Eve’s actions
E1B(ρ̂AB) = K̂BE1BĴBEρ̂AB ⊗ |eE〉〈eE|Ĵ
†
BE1BK̂
†
BE,
E
ẐB
(ρ̂AB) = K̂BEẐBĴBEρ̂AB ⊗ |eE〉〈eE|Ĵ
†
BEẐBK̂
†
BE.(3)
It is assumed that Bob encodes bit 0 or 1 with probability
1/2.
Our aim is to quantify the maximum information
achievable by Eve in terms of the quantities measured
2by Alice and Bob in the Anticorrelation Check. We de-
fine the quantities P01 and P10 as the probabilities of
anticorrelated results according to
P01 = tr[ĴBEρ̂AB ⊗ |eE〉〈eE|Ĵ
†
BEΠ̂01],
P10 = tr[ĴBEρ̂AB ⊗ |eE〉〈eE|Ĵ
†
BEΠ̂10], (4)
where Π̂01 = |0
1
A1
1
B〉〈0
1
A1
1
B|, Π̂10 = |1
1
A0
1
B〉〈1
1
A0
1
B| are pro-
jection operators. We assume ρ̂AB = 1/2|ψ
−
AB〉〈ψ
−
AB| +
1/2|ψ+AB〉〈ψ
+
AB| (Alice prepares only states |ψ
±
AB〉 with
probability 12 ), in the absence of Eve’s attack P01 =
P10 = 0.5 (perfect anticorrelation). Eve’s actions lower
the value of P01 and P10 and this is basically the signa-
ture of her presence.
The maximum of the mutual information between Bob
and Eve IB:E, i.e. Eve’s ability to distinguish Bob’s op-
erations, can be evaluated exploiting the Holevo bound
[4]: IB:E ≤ IB:E. Consider the following scenario: Alice
prepares the state ρ̂AB, Bob encodes his key, and Eve
couples her system to photon B. The maximum mutual
information between Bob and Eve IB:E is bounded by
IB:E = S[E(ρ̂AB)]−
1
2
S[E1B(ρ̂AB)]−
1
2
S[E
ẐB
(ρ̂AB)], (5)
where S(ρ̂) is the Von Neumann entropy [4] of the generic
state ρ̂.
Analogously, also the maximum of mutual information
between Alice and Eve IA:E, i.e. Eve’s ability to distin-
guish the states prepared by Alice, is calculated exploit-
ing the Holevo bound (IA:E ≤ IA:E). In this case
IA:E = S[E(ρ̂AB)]−
1
2
S[E(|ψ−AB〉〈ψ
−
AB|)]−
1
2
S[E(|ψ+AB〉〈ψ
+
AB|)].
(6)
To evaluate IA:E and IB:E in terms of P01 and P10 we
define the final states in the coupled space HA⊗HB⊗HE
after Bob’s and Eve’s operations
K̂BE1BĴBE|ψ
+
AB〉 ⊗ |eE〉 = |µ
+
ABE〉,
K̂BE1BĴBE|ψ
−
AB〉 ⊗ |eE〉 = |µ
−
ABE〉,
K̂BEẐBĴBE|ψ
+
AB〉 ⊗ |eE〉 = |ν
+
ABE〉,
K̂BEẐBĴBE|ψ
−
AB〉 ⊗ |eE〉 = |ν
−
ABE〉, (7)
where we observe that 〈µ−ABE|µ
+
ABE〉 = 0, 〈ν
−
ABE|ν
+
ABE〉 =
0.
Before the Anticorrelation Check (or the Bob’s opera-
tion) the evolution of the system can be completely de-
scribed by Eve’s operation of coupling photon B with her
ancilla system
ĴBE|1
1
B〉 ⊗ |eE〉 = α|1
1
B〉 ⊗ |αE〉+ γ|ΓBE〉,
ĴBE|0
1
B〉 ⊗ |eE〉 = β|0
1
B〉 ⊗ |βE〉+ δ|∆BE〉, (8)
with 〈11B|ΓBE〉 = 0 and 〈0
1
B|∆BE〉 = 0. |αE〉, |βE〉, |ΓBE〉,
|∆BE〉 are normalized to one and the operator ĴBE is uni-
tary thus |α|2 + |γ|2 = |β|2 + |δ|2 = 1. The states |ΓBE〉
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FIG. 1: Plot of the maximum of IB:E (a) and IA:E (b) versus
P01 and P10
and |∆BE〉 represent situations in which the Anticorre-
lation Check produces unexpected (”wrong”) results due
to e.g. bit-flip, vacuum state or state with more than one
photon in the channel B. This is the main difference with
respect to the security proof proposed in [2] where Alice
and Bob considered that only the bit-flip was the signa-
ture of Eve’s presence. In this respect the probabilities of
anticorrelated results are P01 = |α|
2/2 and P10 = |β|
2/2.
Thus, we can obtain the relation between P01 and P10,
and the final states of the coupled system, by inserting
Eq.s (8) in the left hand side of Eq.s (7). Observing
that 〈µ+ABE|ν
−
ABE〉 = 〈µ
−
ABE|ν
+
ABE〉 , p, 〈µ
+
ABE|ν
+
ABE〉 =
〈µ−ABE|ν
−
ABE〉 , q we obtain
p =
c− d
2
− P01(1 + c)− P10(1− d),
q =
c+ d
2
− P01(1 + c) + P10(1− d), (9)
where c = 〈ΓBE|ẐB|ΓBE〉 and d = 〈∆BE|ẐB|∆BE〉 are two
real parameters (c and d ∈ [−1, 1]) under Eve’s control
that cannot be evaluated by Alice and Bob [5].
According to Eq. (5), we evaluate IB:E. From
Eq.s (3) and Eq.s (7) we obtain S[E1B(ρ̂AB)] = 1,
S[E
ẐB
(ρ̂AB)] = 1. The calculation of S[E(ρ̂AB)] is not
trivial. In order to obtain the diagonal representation
of the state E(ρ̂AB) we introduce the orthonormal base
S : {|µ−ABE〉, |µ
+
ABE〉, |ξ
(1)
ABE〉, |ξ
(2)
ABE〉}. S spans the generic
subspace of the Hilbert space HA ⊗HB ⊗HE support of
E(ρ̂AB). According to Eq.s (9), the states |ν
−
ABE〉 and
|ν+ABE〉 can be rewritten as
|ν−ABE〉 = p|µ
+
ABE〉+ q|µ
−
ABE〉+ s|ξ
(1)
ABE〉+ t|ξ
(2)
ABE〉,
|ν+ABE〉 = q|µ
+
ABE〉+ p|µ
−
ABE〉+ r|ξ
(1)
ABE〉,
where r, s and t are complex, and p and q, according
with Eq. (9), are real. From the normalization and or-
thogonality conditions on |ν+ABE〉 and |ν
−
ABE〉 we obtain
3the Von Neumann entropy of E(ρ̂AB) as
S[E(ρ̂AB)] = −
4∑
i=1
λilogλi. (10)
where λ1 =
1
4 (1−p−q), λ2 =
1
4 (1+p+q), λ3 =
1
4 (1−p+q)
and λ4 =
1
4 (1 + p− q). Thus,
IB:E = −
4∑
i=1
λilogλi − 1. (11)
As Alice and Bob have only access to the results of the
Anticorrelation Check, for any fixed pair of values P01
and P10 the maximum information achievable by Eve,
maxc,d{IB:E}, corresponds to the maximum value of IB:E
in the range of values allowed for c and d. As shown in
Fig. 1 (a) the behavior of maxc,d{IB:E} versus P01 and
P10 can be analyzed by considering four regions. Specif-
ically
• for P01 ≥ 0.25 and P10 ≥ 0.25
maxc,d{IB:E} = IB:E(P01,P10, c = 1, d = −1)
• for P01 < 0.25 and P10 ≥ 0.25
maxc,d{IB:E} = IB:E(P01,P10, c =
2P01
1−2P01 , d = −1)
• for P01 ≥ 0.25 and P10 < 0.25
maxc,d{IB:E} = IB:E(P01,P10, c = 1, d =
2P10
2P10−1 ))
• for P01 < 0.25 and P10 < 0.25
maxc,d{IB:E} = 1.
Thus, for P01 ≥ 0.25 or P10 ≥ 0.25 the maximum in-
formation achievable by Eve is upper-bounded, and for
P01 = P10 = 0.5 (perfect anticorrelation) Eve can get no
information at all.
According to Eq. (6), we evaluate IA:E. Observ-
ing that the eigenvalues of both E(|ψ−AB〉〈ψ
−
AB|) and
E(|ψ+AB〉〈ψ
+
AB|) are λ
′
1 =
1
2 (1 − q) and λ
′
2 =
1
2 (1 + q),
we obtain
IA:E =
2∑
i=1
λ′ilogλ
′
i −
4∑
j=1
λj logλj . (12)
As previously, Alice and Bob has only access to P01 and
P10, thus we evaluate maxc,d{IA:E}, the maximum value
of IA:E in the range of c and d allowed values.
In Fig. 1 (b) maxc,d{IA:E} is plotted versus P01 and
P10 where only two regions are identified.
• For P01 + P10 ≥ 0.5
maxc,d{IA:E} = IA:E(P01,P10, c = 1, d = −1)
• for P01 + P10 < 0.5
maxc,d{IA:E} = 1.
Note that the maximum information achievable by
Eve is upper-bounded only if P01 + P10 ≥ 0.5, but
also in this case Eve cannot gain any information for
P01 = P10 = 0.5. It is straightforward to demon-
strate that maxc,d{IA(B):E}(P01 = P ,P10 = P) ≥
maxc,d{IA(B):E}(P01 = P − k,P10 = P + k) with −P ≤
k ≤ P . Despite the different shapes of the two sur-
faces in Fig. 1, for any values of P , we observe that
maxc,d{IA:E}(P01 = P ,P10 = P) = maxc,d{IB:E}(P01 =
P ,P10 = P) = H(1 − 2P) for 0.25 < P ≤ 0.5, while
maxc,d{IA:E}(P01 = P ,P10 = P) = maxc,d{IB:E}(P01 =
P ,P10 = P) = 1 for 0 ≤ P < 0.25 where H is the Shan-
non entropy of a binary channel [4].
In summary, the maximum information achievable by
Eve is upper-bounded in some region, even when Eve can
modify the number of photons in the quantum channel.
Moreover these upper bounds have been demonstrated
to be strictly related to the Anticorrelation Check out-
comes. Thus measurement of P01, P10 would allow Alice
and Bob to determine the security level of the communi-
cation. In addition we point out that, as in [2], Eve’s re-
sources have been heavily overestimated in deriving Eq.s
(11) and (12). In order to extract information on Alice
and Bob operations, we assumed that Eve should per-
form any POVM on the final state of the whole space
HA⊗HB⊗HE as clearly stated in Eq.s (5) and (6). This
is obviously not the case. Even if Eve can perform any
POVM on the final state of her ancilla system, about the
Alice-Bob system, she can only know the results disclosed
during the public discussion. This induces to think that
information achievable by Eve should be in some cases
well below these limits.
As already pointed out in [2], Alice’s and Bob’s are able
to recover secure cryptographic keys in spite of Eve’s at-
tack if the condition IA:B > IA:E. and IA:B > IB:E is sat-
isfied [6], where IA:B is the mutual information between
Alice and Bob (Ref. [7] demonstrates that this condition
is, in some cases, too restrictive). IA:B can be simply
calculated considering the capacity of a noisy channel of
quantum bit error rate Q, as IA:B = 1 − H(Q) [4]. To
ensure the security of the two generated keys, we replace
IA:E and IB:E with maxc,d{IA:E} and maxc,d{IB:E} cal-
culated for P01 = P10 = P . This means that Alice and
Bob can distill common secret keys when 0.25 < P ≤ 0.5
and
H(Q) +H(1− 2P) < 1. (13)
Despite the fact that Eq. (13) appears to be formally
analogous to Eq. (6) in [2], we underline that in Eq.
(13) the term P (P ≃ P01+P102 ) should be carefully eval-
uated from the experimental data as the ratio between
the anticorrelated results and all possible results (anti-
correlated and ”wrong”) of the Anticorrelation Check.
The results of the Anticorrelation Check should be con-
sidered ”wrong” not only in the case of correlated re-
sults, but also if more than two photon are detected in
coincidence by the Alice and Bob apparatuses, or if only
one of Alice’s detector fires. This last case makes the
QDKD protocol not practical for today technology as all
the transmission losses and detection inefficiencies would
be considered due to eavesdropping attack.
4Let us consider, as an example, the experimental real-
ization of QDKD protocol performed in [2]. Losses due
to the detection apparatuses (which is the main contri-
bution) as well as to the source and to the encoder ap-
paratuses strongly affect the estimation of the parameter
P . In fact, the probability of losing one photon of the
pair by the generation-detection apparatuses was esti-
mated to be Ploss ≃ 0.77, and we observed a probability
of correlated results Pcorr < 0.05 due to optics imper-
fections, misalignment and dark counts. The probabil-
ity of measuring a three-fold or four-fold coincidences
due to the presence of more than a photon pair in the
quantum channels or to dark counts was completely neg-
ligible. Also losses in the quantum channels are com-
pletely negligible (propagation in air for less than one
meter). Thus the anticorrelation parameter P is evalu-
ated as P = (1− Ploss − Pcorr)/2 ≃ 0.09, and, according
to the considerations related to Eq. (13), common secret
keys cannot be distilled.
But if we assume that Eve cannot modify Alice and
Bob detection apparatuses as she has not access to their
laboratories, the detection inefficiencies can be traced out
in the evaluation of P , and we could implement secure
QDKD protocols for short distances and in low noise en-
vironment. In particular, in the case of the experimental
implementation of Ref. [2] the anticorrelation parameter
simply reduces to P = (1 − Pcorr)/2 ≃ 0.47, and the
secure keys distribution can be ascertained.
In Ref.s [8] and [9] two protocols are proposed for uni-
directional secure direct communication (message from
Bob to Alice) based on local operations on one photon
of an EPR pair. We observe that the QDKD scheme
can be used to implement bidirectional secure determin-
istic communication (either message from Alice to Bob
or from Bob to Alice).
When a deterministic message is sent from Bob to Al-
ice, Alice encodes a random sequence of bits and Bob en-
codes the deterministic message. As Alice is aware of her
operations (1B or ẐB), she can extract the message-bit
encoded by Bob from the measurement result |ψ+AB〉 or
|ψ−AB〉. During the communication Bob discloses the re-
sults obtained from his Anticorrelation Check apparatus
on a non-jammable public channel, i.e. a public chan-
nel that can be monitored but not modified by anybody
else. According to these results as well as to her measure-
ments, Alice estimates the security level of the on-going
communication. If the communication is insecure, Alice
and Bob decide to abort the transmission. A drawback
of this protocol, as well as of the protocols in Ref.s [8]
and [9], is that part of the secret message is in any case
eavesdropped before the transmission is stopped.
When a deterministic message is sent from Alice to
Bob, Bob encodes a random sequence of bits (in some
sense a cryptographic key), and Alice encodes the de-
terministic message. The measurement of a sequence
of |ψ+AB〉, |ψ
−
AB〉 corresponds to the Alice’s message en-
crypted by Bob’s key. After the end of the quantum
communication, Bob discloses the results obtained from
his Anticorrelation Check apparatus on a non-jammable
public channel. According to these results as well as to
her measurements, Alice estimates the security level of
the communication. If communication is secure, Alice
discloses the results of her measurements corresponding
to the message encrypted by Bob’s key. Since Bob is
aware of his key, he can extract the message encoded by
Alice. Only if the security of the communication is as-
certained the encrypted message is publicly disclosed by
Alice, thus this protocol is not affected by the security
drawback present in the communication from Bob to Al-
ice and in protocols of Ref.s [8] and [9].
Furthermore in both protocols of Ref.s [8] and [9] the
security proofs consider that Eve’s presence only induces
bit-flips and they do not consider eavesdropping strate-
gies based on injection-subtraction of photons in the
quantum channel. In fact a successful eavesdropping at-
tack against protocol in Ref. [8] based on subtraction
of photons has already been proposed [10], while valid
eavesdropping strategies have not yet been found against
protocol of Ref. [9]. We observe that for both these pro-
tocols a security proof analogous to the one here proposed
is necessary in order to guarantee the security against
also the attacks based on injection-subtraction of pho-
tons.
In conclusion, this Reply proposes an improved secu-
rity proof of the QDKD protocol which is able to de-
tect any individual eavesdropping attack and to provide
an upper bound to the information achievable by Eve,
even in the case of attacks exploiting the possibility of
injecting-subtracting photons in the quantum channel as
the ones proposed in Wo´jcik’s Comment [1].
The work was supported by MIUR (Project 67679) and
by Elsag S.p.A.
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